Book reviewed in this article: The Willowbrook Wars: A Decade of Struggle for Social Justice. By David J. Rothman and Sheila M. Rothman.

This book examines Augustine's description of the actually existing world, especially that aspect most important for the human pursuit of happiness: the human being and God. It begins with an overview of the characteristics of the human individual and the context in which they must live out their lives, a context dominated by two seemingly contradictory realities: the existence of God and the existence of evil.

God deserves obedience simply because he’s God—or does he? Inspired by a passion for biblical as well as constitutional scholarship, in this bold exploration Yale Law Professor Robert A. Burt conceptualizes the political theory of the Hebrew and Christian Bibles. God’s authority as expressed in these accounts is not a given. It is no less inherently problematic and in need of justification than the legitimacy of secular government. In recounting the rich narratives of key biblical figures—from Adam and Eve (...) to Noah, Cain, Abraham, Moses, Job, and Jesus—In the Whirlwind paints a surprising picture of the ambivalent, mutually dependent relationship between God and his peoples. Taking the Hebrew and Christian Bibles as a unified whole, Burt traces God’s relationship with humanity as it evolves from complete harmony at the outset to continual struggle. In almost every case, God insists on unconditional obedience, while humanity withholds submission and holds God accountable for his promises. Contemporary political theory aims for perfect justice. The Bible, Burt shows, does not make this assumption. Justice in the biblical account is an imperfect process grounded in human—and divine—limitation. Burt suggests that we consider the lessons of this tension as we try to negotiate the power struggles within secular governments, and also the conflicts roiling our public and private lives. (shrink)

The standard model for end‐of‐life decision‐making gives roles to two parties—the physician, who explains the medical options, and the patient, who selects from among those options. The model can be harmful not only for individuals but also for the state, if the patient's right to control her own choices is understood as a positive right of access to whatever is available.

The story of patient self‐determination cannot be told without the Nuremberg trials. Patient autonomy was the first criterion enunciated by the Nuremberg judges and has served as a touchstone for human subject research and patient care ever since. Yet this ideal was in an important sense irrelevant at the moment it was originally proclaimed.

The standard model for end‐of‐life decision‐making gives roles to two parties—the physician, who explains the medical options, and the patient, who selects from among those options. The model can be harmful not only for individuals but also for the state, if the patient's right to control her own choices is understood as a positive right of access to whatever is available.

Book reviewed in this article: Authority. By Richard Sennett.

I would like to thank Geoff Stokes and the journal's anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

Jacob Klein’s own account of the change from the ancient to the modern mode of thinking presented in his seminal Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra included the observation that it did not consider the larger perspective of this change. The discussion to follow proposes to view the larger perspective of this transition through the lens provided by the Kantian concept of a “critique” of pure reason. By asking and attempting to answer the question of whether Klein’s account (...) of what he calls the “symbolic abstraction” responsible for the genesis of the modern concept of number can be seen as what Kant characterizes as an “assessment” of pure reason, it is my intent to venture a prolegomenon to a critique of what, following Klein, I want to argue is most properly called “symbolic reason.”. (shrink)

I would like to thank Geoff Stokes and the journal's anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

Collecting ethnographic items for the Estonian National Museum has been linked to the practice of buying objects during fieldwork. Often we can find metaphors or expressions connected with trading in the Komi fieldwork diaries. Comparing ethnographers with merchants is a stereotypical way of describing the activities of Estonian researchers in the field. If ethnographers use, in their diaries, metaphors and expressions connected to trading, it may be just a spontaneous phrasing or inter-textual play of words. Inside the community of Estonian (...) ethnologists there exists some kind of discourse style, which is followed in the fieldwork diaries, more or less consciously. This style of narration is also connected to the specific social and historical context in which ethnographers act. At the same time, even satiric inter-textual quotations do not exclude the possibility that some of this discourse is related to a deeper level of human consciousness. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis is an account of the emancipatory struggle that faces agents who seek to change the oppressive social structures associated with neo-liberalism. We begin by ‘digging amongst the bones’ of the calls for resistance that have been declared dead or assimilated/co-opted by neoliberal theorists. This leads us to unearth, then utilize, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness and Shiv Visvanathan's ideas; which are examples of Roy Bhaskar’s transformative dialectic. We argue, using examples, that cognitive justice – (...) a concept common to each of our chosen theorists – is vital in enabling emancipatory social learning. By embracing cognitive justice, the agents gained confidence, which led to their increased ability to champion community and non-academic knowledge. It also uncovered structural tensions – attendant in neoliberalism – around privilege. By articulating these tensions, the participants were able to ‘come closer together’. Such processes, initiated by ensuring cognitive justice, are possible steps in achieving universal solidarity; which is likely to be a necessary step along the path of achieving emancipation. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law in Doctor‐Patient Relations. By Robert A. Burt.

The article explores the relationship between the philosopher and historian of mathematics Jacob Klein’s account of the transformation of the concept of number coincident with the invention of algebra, together with Husserl’s early investigations of the origin of the concept of number and his late account of the Galilean impulse to mathematize nature. Klein’s research is shown to present the historical context for Husserl’s twin failures in the Philosophy of Arithmetic: to provide a psychological foundation for the proper concept of (...) number, and to show how this concept of number functions as the mathematical foundation of universal arithmetic. This context establishes that Husserl’s failures are ultimately rooted in the historical transformation of number documented in Klein’s research, from its premodern meaning as the unity of a multitude of determinate objects to its modern meaning as a symbolic representation with no immediate relation to a concrete multiplicity. The argum... (shrink)

This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and a phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion was published in the previous volume of this journal as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion is published here as Part II. Part I first clarified the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification it showed that, in marked contrast to the prevailing (...) approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors (rooted in Freud's theory of repression) in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors (rooted in Jung's theory of apperception) that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concluded with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II shows how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, i. e., the so-called "collective unconscious," can be phenomenologically accounted for if: (1) Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative (hermeneutically phenomenological) approaches to the unconscious is attended to and; (2) such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious. (shrink)

A distinction between nature and culture is usually thought to be a condition of possibility of criticism. The idea is that, in comparison to natural laws, norms and conventions are merely relative and, therefore, susceptible to criticism and change. This paper contests this view and argues that critical practice is still possible, and even more productive, when nature and culture are seen to be continuous with one another. A general contrast is developed between 'dogmatic' and 'sceptical' modes of criticism. The (...) suggestion is that theorists as diverse as Jürgen Habermas and Judith Butler adopt the dogmatic approach. An alternative, sceptical critical mode is elaborated in connection with Nietzsche and the ancient sceptics.This sceptical approach is based upon an identity between nature and culture, and has affinities with the aesthetic emphasis of some contemporary political theory. (shrink)

Behavioral genetic (BG) research has yielded many important discoveries about the origins of human behavior, but offers little insight into how we might improve outcomes. We posit that this gap in our knowledge base stems in part from the epidemiologic nature of BG research questions. Namely, BG studies focus on understanding etiology as it currently exists, rather than etiology in environments that could exist but do not as of yet (e.g., etiology following an intervention). Put another way, they focus exclusively (...) on the etiology of “what is” rather than “what could be”. The current paper discusses various aspects of this field-wide methodological reality, and offers a way to overcome it by demonstrating how behavioral geneticists can incorporate an experimental approach into their work. We outline an ongoing study that embeds a randomized intervention within a twin design, connecting “what is” and “what could be” for the first time. We then lay out a more general framework for a new field—experimental BGs—which has the potential to advance both scientific inquiry and related philosophical discussions. (shrink)

Solly Zuckerman’s work has been largely dismissed or marginalized by both historians of primatology and primatologists. This paper, using archival and published materials, re-examines both his life and his research into primate sexuality and sociology in the 1920s, endocrinology in the 1930s, and the effects of bomb blast in the 1940s. Despite the many flaws in his work, which is now largely outdated, his career reveals a great deal about the audiences for primatological knowledge in pre-war and wartime Britain; the (...) interlocking circles of the scientific community that impinged on primatology; and competing ideas of what constituted a scientifically correct methodology for the observation of primate behaviour. Also noted is the gap between Zuckerman’s self-presentation as the scourge of anthropomorphism and the anthropomorphism of his remarks in private notebooks. Although his work well illustrates familiar themes of patriarchy, military and colonialism in the history of primatology, it also suggests another, underexplored dimension of that science: primatology as an example of cross-species social interaction. (shrink)

The sociogenomics revolution is upon us, we are told. Whether revolutionary or not, sociogenomics is poised to flourish given the ease of incorporating polygenic scores (or PGSs) as “genetic propensities” for complex traits into social science research. Pointing to evidence of ubiquitous heritability and the accessibility of genetic data, scholars have argued that social scientists not only have an opportunity but a duty to add PGSs to social science research. Social science research that ignores genetics is, some proponents argue, at (...) best partial and likely scientifically flawed, misleading, and wasteful. Here, I challenge arguments about the value of genetics for social science and with it the claimed necessity of incorporating PGSs into social science models as measures of genetic influences. In so doing, I discuss the impracticability of distinguishing genetic influences from environmental influences because of non-causal gene–environment correlations, especially population stratification, familial confounding, and downward causation. I explain how environmental effects masquerade as genetic influences in PGSs, which undermines their raison d’être as measures of genetic propensity, especially for complex socially contingent behaviors that are the subject of sociogenomics. Additionally, I draw attention to the partial, unknown biology, while highlighting the persistence of an implicit, unavoidable reductionist genes versus environments approach. Leaving sociopolitical and ethical concerns aside, I argue that the potential scientific rewards of adding PGSs to social science are few and greatly overstated and the scientific costs, which include obscuring structural disadvantages and cultural influences, outweigh these meager benefits for most social science applications. (shrink)

De acuerdo con la así llamada concepción platonista de la naturaleza de las entidades matemáticas, las afirmaciones matemáticas son análogas a las afirmaciones acerca de objetos físicos reales y sus relaciones, con la diferencia decisiva de que las entidades matemáticas no son ni físicas ni espacio temporalmente individuales, y, por tanto, no son percibidas sensorialmente. El platonismo matemático es, por lo tanto, de la misma índole que el platonismo en general, el cual postula la tesis de un mundo ideal de (...) entidades –eídē– que a la vez están separadas (chōristón) y son el fundamento cognitivo y ontológico del mundo real de cosas físicas que poseen propiedades espacio-temporales. Mientras que la no-identidad entre la concepción platonista de las entidades matemáticas y el platonismo del Platón “histórico” es frecuentemente reconocida tácita o explícitamente tanto por sus defensores como por sus críticos, su conexión conla crítica del Aristóteles “histórico” a la filosofía de Platón frecuentemente no es reconocida. Este artículo llama la atención sobre la conexión de Aristóteles con el así llamado platonismo tradicionalmente concebido y reconstruye un aspecto crucial de su crítica a la tesis originaria del chōrismós platónico que se pierde de vista a menos que se reconozca el objetivo verdadero de su crítica, la descripción platónica igualmente originaria de los números eidéticos.---“The Source of Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics Revisited: Aristotle’s Critique of Eidetic Numbers”. According to the so-called Platonistic conception of the nature of mathematical entities, mathematical statements are analogous to statements about real physical objects and their relations, with the one decisive difference that mathematical entities are neither physical nor individuated spatio-temporally and, thus, not perceived sensuously. Mathematical Platonism is therefore of a piece with Platonism in general, which posits the thesis of an ideal world of entities –eídē– that are both separate (chōristón) from and the cognitive and ontological foundations of the real world of physical things possessing spatio-temporal properties. While the non-identity of the Platonistic conception of mathematical entities with the Platonism of the “historical” Plato is usually either tacitly or explicitly acknowledged by its defenders and critics alike, its connection with the “historical” Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s philosophy usually goes unacknowledged. This paper both calls attention to Aristotle’s connection with the so-called Platonism traditionally conceived and reconstructs a crucial aspect of his critique of the original Platonic chōrismós thesis, an aspect that is missed unless the true target of this critique, the equally original Platonic account of eidetic numbers, is recognized. (shrink)

Hopkins begins his study with Plato's written and unwritten theories of eidê and Aristotle's criticism of both. He then traces Husserl's early investigations into the formation of mathematical and logical concepts, charting the critical necessity that leads from descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology. An investigation of the movement of Husserl's phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity follows. Hopkins then presents the final stage of the development of Husserl's thought, which situates monadological intersubjectivity within the context of (...) the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning. An exposition of the unwarranted historical presuppositions that guide Heidegger's fundamental ontological and Derrida's deconstructive criticisms of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology concludes the book. By following Husserl's personal trajectory Hopkins is able to show the unity of Husserl's philosophical enterprise, challenging the prevailing view that Husserl's late turn to history is inconsistent with his earlier attempts to establish phenomenology as a pure science. Contents: Introduction Part I Descriptive Psychology 1. Investigation of the Origin of Number 2. Investigation of the Origin of Logical Signification Part II Cartesian Transcendental Phenomenology 3. Investigation of the Origin of Objective Transcendence 4. Investigation of the Origin of Subjective Transcendence Part III Historical Transcendental Phenomenology 5. The Crisis of Meaning in Contemporary European Science 6. Historical Investigation of the Phenomenological Origin Part IV Husserl and his Critics 7. Fundamental Critiques of Transcendental Phenomenology 8. A Husserlian Response to the Critics. (shrink)

The main question informing this paper is whether it is possible to extend democracy beyond its liberal forms. The paper reflects upon this question with regard to its implications for the individual. For the radicalization of democracy implies a need for self-transformation, if the everyday egoism of contemporary citizens is not to thwart reasonable discussion and participation. Theorists such as Richard Rorty argue that the philosophical resources required to guide such self-transformation can be made available only by sacrificing the political (...) freedom and cultural diversity liberalism has been able to precariously establish. Other theorists insist that the thresholds of pluralism and tolerance that existing liberal democracies are struggling to maintain actually require an extension of democracy. The paper evaluates two different theoretical strategies that aim to identify potentials for democratization without falling prey to the dilemma identified by Rorty: a ‘ deliberative’ strategy explicated with reference to Jürgen Habermas and an ‘existential’ approach represented here by William Connolly. Key Words: Connolly • democracy • existential • Habermas • individual • proceduralism • Rorty. (shrink)

This essay addresses the subject of animal representation via an historical account of the place of the animal in visual culture. It emphasizes the relationship between the animal as a visual image and the technology that produces this image. It explores three examples in a period covering c. 1895 to the 1930s, in Britain, that analyze the relations between animal representation, technology, and the public domain. These are film, zoo display, and slaughterhouse practice. The overall goal of the essay is (...) to move away from emphasis on the textual, metaphorical animal, which reduces the animal to a mere icon, to achieve a more integrated view of the effects of the presence of the animals and the power of its imagery in human history."[s]i l'animal a le temps, s'il est «constitué» par un «temps»" ["[w]hether the animal has time, whether the animal is 'constituted' by a 'time.'"]. (shrink)

Uchiyama et al. propose a unified model linking cultural evolutionary theory to behavior genetics (BG) to enhance generalizability, enrich explanation, and predict how social factors shape heritability estimates. A consideration of culture evolution is beneficial but insufficient for purpose. I submit that their proposed model is underdeveloped and their emphasis on heritability estimates misguided. I discuss their ambiguous conception of culture, neglect of social structure, and the lack of a general theory in BG.

Animals navigate through three-dimensional environments, but we argue that the way they encode three-dimensional spatial information is shaped by how they use the vertical component of space. We agree with Jeffery et al. that the representation of three-dimensional space in vertebrates is probably bicoded (with separation of the plane of locomotion and its orthogonal axis), but we believe that their suggestion that the vertical axis is stored (that is, not containing distance or direction metrics usable for novel computations) is unlikely, (...) and as yet unsupported. We describe potential experimental protocols that could clarify these differences in opinion empirically. (shrink)

Collecting ethnographic items for the Estonian National Museum has been linked to the practice of buying objects during fieldwork. Often we can find metaphors or expressions connected with trading in the Komi fieldwork diaries. Comparing ethnographers with merchants is a stereotypical way of describing the activities of Estonian researchers in the field. If ethnographers use, in their diaries, metaphors and expressions connected to trading, it may be just a spontaneous phrasing or inter-textual play of words. Inside the community of Estonian (...) ethnologists there exists some kind of discourse style, which is followed in the fieldwork diaries, more or less consciously. This style of narration is also connected to the specific social and historical context in which ethnographers act. At the same time, even satiric inter-textual quotations do not exclude the possibility that some of this discourse is related to a deeper level of human consciousness. (shrink)

Husserl’s most systematic phenomenological work, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Ideas I) (Husserl, 2014), differentiates pure transcendental phenomenology, as an eidetic science, from the eidetic science of mathematics. In line with the tradition of transcendental philosophy arguably—ante rem—stretching back to Plato, Husserl contrasts transcendental phenomenology with mathematics and argues that its conceptuality cannot be appropriately articulated and conceived in analogy with mathematics. While both mathematics and transcendental phenomenology are eidetic sciences, (...) phenomenology “belongs to a basic class of eidetic sciences … [that is] totally different from that to which the mathematical sciences belong” (Husserl, 2014, 136). The key differential between these two sciences on Husserl’s view concerns the nature of the essences that are the subject matter of each discipline. Mathematics deals with exact essences, which he characterizes as ideas in the Kantian sense. Phenomenology deals with inexact essences, which Husserl characterizes as morphological. (shrink)